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Abstract
The main purpose of this paper is to prove the existence of the fuzzy core of an exchange economy with a heterogeneous divisible
commodity in which preferences of individuals are given by nonadditive utility functions defined on a -algebra of admissible
pieces of the total endowment of the commodity. The problem is formulated as the partitioning of a measurable space among finitely
many individuals. Applying the Yosida–Hewitt decomposition theorem, we also demonstrate that partitions in the fuzzy core are
supportable by prices in L1.
© 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Cooperative fuzzy games proposed by Aubin [2,3] allow for partial participation of individuals in coalitions. In
defining the fuzzy core of exchange economies with homogeneous divisible commodities, individuals contribute only
some portions of their initial endowments to coalitions they belong to. That is, a fuzzy coalition unlike the classical
(crisp) coalitions, does not necessarily require its participants to contribute the whole of their initial endowments.
A remarkable result for exchange economies established by Aubin states that under the standard assumptions of
continuous, convex preferences the fuzzy core and the set of Walrasian allocations coincide (see also [12,14]).
In this paper we study the fuzzy core of an exchange economy with a heterogeneous divisible commodity in which
preferences of individuals are given by set functions defined in a -algebra of admissible pieces of the total endow-
ment of the commodity. Following the traditions of fair division literature along the lines of Dubins and Spanier
[9], a heterogeneous divisible commodity is modeled as a nonatomic finite measure space. The total endowment
of the heterogeneous commodity is metaphorically called a “cake” in this literature and the problem of fair divi-
sion consists in partitioning the cake among a finite number of individuals according some criteria of fairness and
efficiency.
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A common assumption in the theory of fair division is that the preferences of each individual are represented by
a nonatomic probability measure. Under this additive utility hypothesis, Lyapunov’s convexity theorem (see [19])
guarantees the convexity and compactness of the utility possibility set, crucial to establishing the existence and charac-
terization of various solutions. However, here we assume preferences to be represented by nonadditive utility functions;
hence the utility possibility set does not necessarily possess these properties. The utility functions assumed here contain
concave measures introduced by Sagara and Vlach [21–23].
Hüsseinov [15,17] and Sagara and Vlach [24] proved the existence of the core with nonadditive evaluations for
exchange economies with heterogeneous divisible commodity under diverse assumptions. The corresponding result for
the case of the fuzzy core is not straightforward; an adequate notion of fuzzy improvement must reflect awareness of
agents of the bounds of the available heterogeneous divisible commodity. We propose here a such notion of the fuzzy
improvement and the fuzzy core.
The organization of the paper is as follows: In Section 2 we present a representation result for concave measures,
stating that an arbitrary concave measure can be represented as a composition of a concave function and a finite-
dimensional nonatomic vector measure. From this characterization we derive the continuity of concave measures at
the measurable set whose vector measure lies in the interior of Lyapunov’s set. We also provide a core representation
theorem for nonatomic vector measure games along the lines of Einy et al. [11].
Section 3 is devoted to the formulation of the fuzzy coalitions and fuzzy core. To this end, we focus our attention
on the case where the single heterogeneous divisible commodity possesses a finite number of attributes, which can be
evaluated objectively in terms of finite-dimensional nonatomic vector measures. We define the notions of the fuzzy
coalitions and fuzzy core in an exchange economy with a heterogeneous divisible commodity, where each individual
has a utility function represented by a nonadditive set function.
The main result of this paper, Theorem 4.2 on the existence of the fuzzy core, is stated in Section 4. To prove this
theorem, we extend the commodity space from the set of measurable sets to the set of measurable functions taking values
in the unit interval along the lines of Akin [1], Dall’Aglio [7] and Dvoretsky et al. [10]. If f in L∞ is a characteristic
function of a measurable set A, then an individual possessing f is fully entitled to set A and to nothing else. Thus,
we can treat allocations in the extended economy with an L∞-commodity space, which can be embedded into the
framework of Bewley [5,6]. We prove the existence of the fuzzy core of this extended economy by constructing a
nontransferrable utility (NTU) game and showing that it satisfies the assumptions of Scarf’s core existence theorem
(see [25]). Exploiting a technique from Lindenstrauss [18], the existence of the fuzzy core in the original exchange
economy follows from the observation that the extreme points in the fuzzy core of the extended economy are indeed
measurable partitions.
Section 5 deals with the supportability of efficient partitions by prices. The argument is based on the effective use of
the separation theorem under the convexity assumption. We demonstrate that partitions in the fuzzy core are supportable
by prices in L1, applying the Yosida–Hewitt decomposition theorem (see [26]), which is by now a standard method,
having been established by Bewley [5,6].
Appendix provides a supplementary result on the extension of continuous, quasiconcave, strictly monotonic functions
on a compact convex subset of the nonnegative orthant to the entire domain.
2. Representation and continuity of concave measures
2.1. Representation of concave measures
Let (,F) be a measurable space with a -algebraF of subsets of a nonempty set. A measure  onF is nonatomic
if, for every A ∈ F with (A) > 0, there exists E ∈ F with E ⊂ A such that 0 < (E) < (A). For nonatomic finite
measures 1, . . . , m , we denote by  = (1, . . . , m) an Rm-valued vector measure. Lyapunov’s convexity theorem
asserts that the range R() of  is a compact and convex set in Rm (see [19]).
For an arbitrarily given A ∈ F and t ∈ [0, 1], we define the family Kt (A) of measurable subsets of A by:
Kt (A) = {E ∈ F | E ⊂ A and (E) = t (A)}.
By Lyapunov’s convexity theorem, Kt (A) is nonempty for every A ∈ F and t ∈ [0, 1]. Furthermore, for an arbitrarily
given A, B ∈ F and t ∈ [0, 1], we denote byKt (A, B) the family of sets C ∈ F , which are written as the union of some
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disjoint sets E ∈ Kt (A) and F ∈ K1−t (B). For a nonatomic scalar measure  we use notation Kt (A, B). It is evident
that C ∈ Kt (A, B) if and only if C ∈ Kkt (A, B) for each k = 1, . . . ,m, and hence, Kt (A, B) =
⋂m
k=1Kkt (A, B)
for every A, B ∈ F and t ∈ [0, 1]. It can be shown that Kt (A, B) is nonempty for every A, B ∈ F and t ∈ [0, 1]
(see [23]).
The notion of concave measures on -algebras presented in the following definition bears an obvious resemblance
to that of concave functions on real vector spaces. We extend here the definition of Sagara and Vlach [21–23] to the
vector measure case.
Definition 2.1. A set function  : F → R is a concave measure if (∅) = 0 and there exists a finite-dimensional
nonatomic vector measure  such that for every A, B ∈ F and t ∈ [0, 1], we have
t(A) + (1 − t)(B) ≤ (C) for every C ∈ Kt (A, B).
When the underlying vector measure is  for the concave measure , we say that  is a -concave measure.
The following result presents a useful representation of concave measures.
Theorem 2.1. A set function  : F → R is a concave measure if and only if there exist a finite-dimensional nonatomic
vector measure  and a concave function  : R() → R with (0) = 0 such that  =  ◦ .
Proof. Suppose that  is a -concave measure. For the construction of a concave function asserted in the theorem, it
suffices to show that if (A) = (B), then (A) = (B), because if this is the case, the value (A) depends exclusively
on (A), which implies that (A) = ((A)) for the real-valued function  defined on the compact convex setR() as
(x) = (A), where A ∈ F and (A) = x . The concavity of  follows from that of .
Suppose that (A) = (B). Let A1 ⊂ A\ B and B1 ⊂ B \ A be such that (A1) = 12 (A\ B) and (B1) = 12 (B \ A),
which is possible by Lyapunov’s convexity theorem. Define C = A1 ∪ B1 ∪ (A ∩ B) and D = (A ∪ B) \ (A1 ∪ B1).
Then, (C) = (D) and C, D ∈ K1/2(A, B). It is easily seen that also A, B ∈ K1/2(C, D). By the concavity of ,
we have
(A) ≥ 12 ((C) + (D)), (B) ≥ 12 ((C) + (D)),
(C) ≥ 12 ((A) + (B)) and (D) ≥ 12 ((A) + (B)).
Summing these inequalities up we will have an inequality where the left and right hand sides are the same. Therefore,
all the inequalities in the above are in fact equalities. It follows from this observation that (A) = (B).
The converse implication that  =  ◦  is a concave measure immediately follows from the concavity of  and
(0) = 0. 
Recall that a set function  : F → R is submodular if (A ∪ B) + (A ∩ B) ≤ (A) + (B) for every A, B ∈ F .
The next example is due to Sagara and Vlach [24].
Example 2.1. Let  be a nonatomic scalar measure. Define the set function  : F → R for a continuous function
 : R() → R with (0) = 0 by  =  ◦ . The following conditions are equivalent:
(i)  is concave;
(ii)  is -concave;
(iii)  is submodular.
The equivalence in the example is not true for the vector measure case. Indeed, for m = 2, one can construct an
example in which there exists a continuous concave functionwith(0) = 0 such that  is not -concave. For details,
see Sagara and Vlach [21].
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2.2. Continuity of concave measures
Sets A and B in F are -equivalent if (AB) = 0, where AB = (A ∪ B)\(A ∩ B) is the symmetric difference
of A and B. The -equivalence defines an equivalence relation (reflexive, symmetric, transitive binary relation) on F .
We denote the -equivalence class of A ∈ F by [A] and denote the set of -equivalence classes in F by F. Define the
metric d on F by d([A], [B]) = ‖(AB)‖, where ‖ · ‖ is the Euclidean norm of Rm . If F is countably generated,
then the metric space (F, d) is complete and separable (see [8, Lemma III.7.113, Theorem 40.B13, Theorem 40.B]).
Continuous functions on (F, d) arise in a natural way from the set functions on F . The following definition is a
straightforward generalization of Sagara and Vlach [21,22] to the vector measure case.
Definition 2.2. A set function  : F → R is -continuous at A ∈ F if for every  > 0 there exists  > 0 such that
‖(AB)‖ <  implies |(A)−(B)| < . When  is -continuous at every element ofF we say that  is -continuous.
The -continuity of set functions on F is stronger than the continuity of those in the measure-theoretic sense:  is
continuous at A ∈ F if for every sequence {Aq} in F with Aq ↑ A or Aq ↓ A, we have limq (Aq ) = (A).
We denote by intR() and bdR() the interior of R() and the boundary of R(), respectively.
Corollary 2.1. Every -concave measure is -continuous at every A ∈ F with (A) ∈ intR().
Proof. By Theorem 2.1, any concave measure  is of the form  =  ◦ , where  : R() → R is a concave
function. Let {Aq} be a sequence in F with (AqA) → 0. Then we have (Aq ) → (A) because of the inequality
−k(AqA) ≤ k(Aq ) − k(A) ≤ k(AqA) for each k = 1, . . . ,m. Thus, (Aq ) → (A) since  is continuous on
the interior of its domain as a concave function. 
We denote by ba(,F) the space of bounded, finitely additive, signed measures on F . A set function  : F → R is
a game if (∅) = 0. A feasible payoff of a game  is an element  in ba(,F) satisfying () = (). The core of a
game  is defined by
C() = { ∈ ba(,F)| ≤  and () = ()},
that is, the core is the set of feasible payoffs upon which no coalition can improve.
Recall that a supergradient of a concave function  : R() → R at x ∈ R() is a vector p ∈ Rm satisfying
(y) − (x) ≤ 〈p, y − x〉 for every y ∈ R(), where 〈·, ·〉 is the inner product in Rm . The superdifferential (x) of
 at x is the set of supergradients of  at x .
Theorem 2.2. If  : F → R is a -concave measure that is -continuous at , then there exists a concave function
 : R() → R with (0) = 0 such that:
C() = {〈p, 〉 ∈ ba(,F)|p ∈ (()), 〈p, ()〉 = (())}. (2.1)
For proving the theorem, we will need the following result by Einy et al. [11].
Lemma 2.1. Let  be a finite-dimensional nonatomic vector measure and  : R() → R be a concave function with
(0) = 0 that is continuous at (). Then the core of the game  =  ◦  is given by (2.1).
Proof of Theorem 2.2. Let  be a -concave measure that is -continuous at . Then  =  ◦  for some concave
function  on R() by Theorem 2.1. Since the -continuity of  =  ◦  at  implies the continuity at  in the
sense that (Aq ) → () for every sequence {Aq} in F with Aq ↑ , the result is an immediate consequence of
Lemma 2.1. 
Theorem 2.2 involves a “core representation” result for -concave measures. Indeed, the core of a -concave measure
 =  ◦  that is -continuous at  can be characterized by the local behavior of the superdifferential of  at ().
This conforms with a similar characterization of the core of a game with the form  =  ◦  obtained by Einy et al.
[11] under the alternative continuity hypothesis.
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3. Fuzzy coalitions in exchange economies
3.1. Partitioning of a measurable space
The problem of dividing a heterogeneous commodity among a finite number of individuals is formulated as parti-
tioning a measurable space (,F). Here, set  is a heterogeneous divisible commodity, and -algebra F of subsets of
 describes the collection of possible pieces of . There are m attributes for the heterogeneous divisible commodity
, each of which has a cardinal evaluation represented by a nonatomic finite measure k on (,F) for k = 1, . . . ,m.
We assume in the sequel that  = (1, . . . , m) is a nonatomic vector measure such that its component measures are
mutually absolutely continuous.
There are n individuals, indexed by i = 1, . . . , n, with the set N = {1, . . . , n} of all individuals, whose preferences on
F are given by utility functions i : F → R for i ∈ N . A partition of  is an ordered n-tuple (A1, . . . , An) of mutually
disjoint elements A1, . . . , An in F whose union is , where each Ai is a piece of the cake assigned to individual i . Let
individual i be initially endowed with i ∈ F for i ∈ N . So (1, . . . ,n) is an initial partition of . An exchange
economy E = 〈(,F),i , i 〉i∈N for the partitioning problem under study is the primitive consisting of a common
consumption set (,F) and the individuals’ profile of initial endowments i and utility functions i .
We formulate partial participation of individuals to coalitions as proposed by Aubin [2,3]. A nonzero vector 	 =
(	1, . . . , 	n) in the unit cube [0, 1]n is called a fuzzy coalition, whose component 	i ∈ [0, 1] denotes the degree of
participation of individual i in this coalition. For each nonempty set S ⊂ N , a fuzzy coalition with support S is a vector
	S = (	S1 , . . . , 	Sn ) ∈ [0, 1]n , satisfying 	Si > 0 for each i ∈ S and 	Si = 0 otherwise; S is the set of ‘active individuals’
in the fuzzy coalition 	S . The vector eS in {0, 1}n defined as eSi = 1 for each i ∈ S and eSi = 0 otherwise is called a
crisp coalition, and is identified with an ordinary (nonfuzzy) coalition S.
Definition 3.1. A partition (A1, . . . , An) is an 	S-partition if for each i ∈ S there exist Ei ∈ K	Si (Ai ) and Fi ∈ K

	Si
(i )
such that

(⋃
i∈S
Ei
⋃
i∈S
Fi
)
= 0.
An eS-partition is simply said to be an S-partition.
It follows from the definition that an S-partition (A1, . . . , An) satisfies the coalitional feasibility constraint character
wise, that is
k
(⋃
i∈S
Ai
⋃
i∈S
i
)
= 0
for each k = 1, . . . ,m.
Definition 3.2. A fuzzy coalition 	S improves upon a partition (B1, . . . , Bn) if there exists an 	S-partition (A1, . . . , An)
such that i (Ai ) > i (Bi ) for each i ∈ S. A partition that cannot be improved upon by any fuzzy coalition is a fuzzy
core partition.
3.2. Allocations in L∞-spaces
Define  = ∑mk=1 k . Let L∞(,F, ) be the space of -essentially bounded measurable functions on  with the
sup norm. Denote by 
A ∈ L∞(,F, ) the characteristic function of A ∈ F .
Let X = { f ∈ L∞(,F, ) | 0 ≤ f ≤ 1, -a.e.}. Then, X is a weakly* compact, convex subset of L∞(,F, ).
We identify F with the subset of characteristic functions in X . An n-tuple ( f1, . . . , fn) of elements in L∞(,F, ) is
an allocation of  if
∑n
i=1 fi = 1 and fi ∈ X for each i ∈ N . Note that (A1, . . . , An) is a partition of  if and only if∑n
i=1 
Ai = 1. We denote by A the set of allocations of .
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For f ∈ X , set k( f ) =
∫ f dk for k = 1, . . . ,m. Given a utility function i of the form i = i ◦  with
i : R() → R, we will denote by ˆi the extension of i to X defined as ˆi ( f ) = i (( f )). This extension is indeed
well defined because R() coincides with the set {( f )| f ∈ X } ⊂ Rm by Lyapunov’s convexity theorem.
An exchange economy Ê = 〈X , 
i , ˆi 〉i∈N for the allocation problem is the primitive consisting of a common
consumption setX and the individuals’ profile of initial endowments 
i and utility functions ˆi , which is an extension
of the original economy E = 〈(,F),i , i 〉i∈N where i = i ◦  for each i ∈ N .
Lemma 3.1. If  : R() → R is continuous and (strictly) (quasi) concave on R(), then function ˆ : X → R of the
form ˆ =  ◦  is weakly* continuous and (strictly) (quasi) concave.
Proof. Let { f q} be a net in X that converges weakly* to f ∈ X . Since each measure k is absolutely continuous with
respect to , there exists gk ∈ L1(,F, ) such that k(A) =
∫
A gkd for every A ∈ F . Then we have limq k( f q ) =
limq
∫ f q gk d = ∫ f gk d = k( f ) for each k = 1, . . . ,m because f q → f in the weak* topology of L∞(,F, ).
Therefore, limq ( f q ) = ( f ). By the continuity of , we obtain limq ˆ( f q ) = limq (( f q )) = (( f )) = ˆ( f ). The
(strict) (quasi)concavity of ˆ follows immediately from that of and the affinity of the mappingX  f( f ) ∈ R().

Lemma 3.2. A is a weakly* compact, convex subset of [L∞(,F, )]n .
To prove this lemma, we borrow from functional analysis the following characterization of weakly* compact sets.
(For a proof, see [8, Corollary V.4.3].)
Proposition 3.1. Let X be a Banach space and X∗ be its dual space. A subset of X∗ is weakly* compact if and only if
it is closed in the weak* topology and bounded in the norm topology.
Proof of Lemma 3.2. The convexity and the norm boundedness of A are obvious. We shall show that A is weakly*
closed in [L∞(,F, )]n . Let ( f q1 , . . . , f qn ) be a net in A that weakly* converges to ( f1, . . . , fn). Suppose that∑n
i=1 fi1. Then there exists a set A ∈ F with (A) > 0 such that
∑n
i=1 fi () < 1 for  ∈ A or
∑n
i=1 fi () > 1 for
 ∈ A. Integrating these inequalities over A, we have∑ni=1 ∫ fi
A d(A), but the weak* convergence f qi → fi in
L∞(,F, ) implies that (A) = ∫A(∑ni=1 f qi )d = ∑ni=1 limq ∫ f qi 
A d = ∑ni=1 ∫ fi
A d(A), a contradic-
tion. Therefore,
∑n
i=1 fi = 1. The proof of the nonnegativity of fi is similar. Hence,
∑n
i=1 fi = 1 and fi ∈ X for
each i ∈ N , which yields ( f1, . . . , fn) ∈ A. The weak* compactness of A follows from Proposition 3.1. 
To explore the notion of fuzzy core allocations for Ê = 〈X , 
i , ˆi 〉i∈N , we introduce a set-valued mapping K̂

t :
X → 2X , an eligible extension of Kt : F → 2F , as follows. For f ∈ X and t ∈ [0, 1], we define:
K̂t ( f ) = {v ∈ X | (v) = t ( f ), v ≤ f }.
It follows from the definition that Kt (A) ⊂ K̂t (
A) for every A ∈ F and t ∈ [0, 1]. Moreover, 
E ∈ K̂t (
A) if and
only if E ∈ Kt (A).
Definition 3.3. An allocation ( f1, . . . , fn) is an 	S-allocation if for each i ∈ S there exist vi ∈ K̂	Si ( fi ) and wi ∈
K̂
	Si
(
i ) such that
∑
i∈S vi =
∑
i∈S wi . An eS-allocation is simply said to be an S-allocation.
Note that (
A1 , . . . , 
An ) is an 	S-allocation with (
Ei , 
Fi ) ∈ K̂

	Si
(
Ai ) × K̂

	Si
(
i ) for each i ∈ S if and only if
(A1, . . . , An) is an 	S-partition with (Ei , Fi ) ∈ K	Si (Ai ) ×K

	Si
(i ) for each i ∈ S. Thus, the notion of 	S-allocations
introduced here is a consistent extension of that of 	S-partitions to L∞-spaces.
Definition 3.4. A fuzzy coalition	S improves upon an allocation ( f1, . . . , fn) if there exists an	S-allocation (g1, . . . , gn)
such that ˆi ( fi ) < ˆi (gi ) for each i ∈ S. An allocation that cannot be improved upon by any fuzzy coalition is a fuzzy
core allocation.
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When commodities are homogeneous and divisible as in classical exchange economies, the usual definition of an
	S-allocation is an allocation ( f1, . . . , fn) such that:∑
i∈S
	Si fi =
∑
i∈S
	Si 
i . (3.1)
(See [2,3,12,14].) Although the definition of 	S-allocations in the sense of (3.1) seems to make sense in the extended
economy Ê , it is inadequate in that it cannot be reduced to the corresponding definition of 	S-partitions in the original
economy E .
To illustrate how this definition malfunctions, consider for n = 2 any fuzzy coalition 	 = (	1, 	2) ∈ [0, 1]2 with
	1	2. Restricting the definition of 	-allocations in the sense of (3.1) to the characteristic functions (
A1 , 
A2 ) with

A1 + 
A2 = 1 yields 	1(
A1 − 
1 ) = 	2(
2 − 
A2 ), which is true if and only if A1 = 1 and A2 = 2. So, every
	-partition with 	1	2 in the sense of (3.1) consists of only the initial partition (1,2). Fuzziness entirely disappears
from the definition.
4. Existence of fuzzy core allocations
4.1. The NTU game for exchange economies
Let N = 2N \ {∅}. The market game V : N → 2Rn with NTU for the exchange economy Ê = 〈X , 
i , ˆi 〉i∈N is
given by
V (S) =
{
(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Rn
∣∣∣∃	S-allocation ( f1, . . . , fn) such that xi ≤ ˆi ( fi ), ∀i ∈ S } .
By construction, V (S) is the utility possibility set of the players (individuals) in S in which payoff vectors are attainable
via some fuzzy coalition 	S . The core C(V ) of V is given by 1
C(V ) = {(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ V (N ) ∣∣(S, y) ∈ N × V (S) such that xi < yi , ∀i ∈ S } .
Proposition 4.1. If for an exchange economy E = 〈(,F),i , i 〉i∈N , utility function i is of the form i = i ◦ 
such that i : R() → R is continuous and quasiconcave for each i ∈ N , then C(V ) is nonempty.
Proof. By the celebrated theorem of Scarf [25], the core of the NTU game V is nonempty if V is comprehensive below
and balanced, V (S) is closed and bounded from above for every S ∈ N , and x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Rn , y = (y1, . . . , yn) ∈
V (S) and xi = yi for each i ∈ S imply x ∈ V (S). We show that V satisfies these conditions.
It is easy to see that each V (S) is comprehensive from below, i.e., x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Rn , y = (y1, . . . , yn) ∈ V (S)
and xi ≤ yi for each i ∈ N imply x ∈ V (S). Moreover, x ∈ Rn , y ∈ V (S) and xi = yi for each i ∈ S imply x ∈ V (S).
Since each ˆi is weakly* continuous by Lemma 3.1, and hence, bounded on the weakly* compact set X , for each
S ∈ N there exists MS ∈ R such that xi ≤ MS for every x ∈ V (S) and i ∈ S.
We shall show that V is a balanced game. To this end, let B be a balanced family in N with balanced weights
{S ≥ 0|S ∈ B} and let Bi = {S ∈ B|i ∈ S}. We then have
∑
S∈Bi 
S = 1 for each i = 1, . . . , n. Define:

Si =
{
1 if S ∈ Bi ,
0 otherwise
and t S = 1
n
∑
i∈N
S
Si .
Then, we have:∑
S∈B
t S = 1
n
∑
S∈B
∑
i∈N
S
Si =
1
n
∑
i∈N
∑
S∈Bi
S = 1.
Choose any x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈
⋂
S∈B V (S). Then, for every S ∈ B, there exists an 	S-allocation ( f S1 , . . . , f Sn ) such
that xi ≤ ˆi ( f Si ) for each i ∈ S. Let fi =
∑
S∈B t S f Si for each i ∈ N . Then, ( f1, . . . , fn) is an allocation because A
1 This definition of the core is sometimes called the weak core in the literature.
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is convex by Lemma 3.2. Since xi ≤ ˆi ( fi ) for each i ∈ N by the quasiconcavity of ˆi established in Lemma 3.1, we
have x ∈ V (N ). Therefore, ⋂S∈B V (S) ⊂ V (N ), and consequently, V is balanced.
We next show that V (S) is closed for every S ∈ B. Let {xq} be a sequence in V (S) converging to x ∈ Rn . Then, there
exists an allocation ( f q1 , . . . , f qn ) such that xqi ≤ ˆi ( f qi ) for each i ∈ S and q = 1, 2, . . .. Since A is weakly* compact
by Lemma 3.2, the sequence {( f q1 , . . . , f qn )} contains a subsequence that is weakly* convergent to ( f1, . . . , fn) ∈ A.
Then we have xi ≤ ˆi ( fi ) for each i ∈ S by the weak* continuity of ˆi . It is easy to verify that ( f1, . . . , fn) is an
	S-allocation. Thus, we obtain x ∈ V (S), and hence, V (S) is closed. 
Corollary 4.1. If for an exchange economy E = 〈(,F),i , i 〉i∈N , utility function i is of the form i = i ◦  such
that i : R() → R is continuous and quasiconcave for each i ∈ N , then there exists a fuzzy core allocation for
Ê = 〈X , 
i , ˆi 〉i∈N .
Proof. By Proposition 4.1, one can choose an element (x1, . . . , xn) in C(V ). Then there exists an 	N -allocation
( f1, . . . , fn) such that xi ≤ ˆi ( fi ) for each i ∈ N . Suppose that ( f1, . . . , fn) is not a fuzzy core allocation. Then there
exists an 	S-allocation (g1, . . . , gn) such that ˆi ( fi ) < ˆi (gi ) for each i ∈ S. Then we have (ˆ1(g1), . . . , ˆn(gn)) ∈ V (S)
and xi < ˆi (gi ) for each i ∈ S, which contradicts the fact that (x1, . . . , xn) is in C(V ). 
4.2. Existence of fuzzy core partitions
Let x = (x1, . . . , xn) be in C(V ) and define the set Cx by
Cx = {( f1, . . . , fn) ∈ A|xi ≤ ˆi ( fi ), ∀i ∈ N }.
It is easy to verify that Cx is a subset of the set of fuzzy core allocations for Ê = 〈X , 
i , ˆi 〉i∈N .
Proposition 4.2. If for an exchange economy E = 〈(,F),i , i 〉i∈N , utility function i is of the form i = i ◦ 
such that i : R() → R is continuous and quasiconcave for each i ∈ N , then there exists a partition (A1, . . . , An)
of  such that (
A1 , . . . , 
An ) ∈ Cx .
The proof of the proposition is essentially based on the ingenious technique of Lindenstrauss [18], yielding that an
extreme point of Cx is indeed a measurable partition of  (see also [1]).
Let K be a nonempty subset of a Banach space X . A point f ∈ K is an extreme point of K if it is not a proper convex
combination of two points in K , i.e., f = 	 f0 + (1 − 	) f1 with f1, f2 ∈ K and 	 ∈ (0, 1) implies f0 = f1.
The following result is a special case of the Krein–Milman theorem (see [8, Lemma V.8.2]).
Theorem 4.1 (Krein–Milman). A nonempty weakly* compact subset of a Banach space has extreme points.
Proof of Proposition 4.2. Note that Cx is nonempty, convex and weakly* compact by Proposition 4.1, and Lemmas
3.1 and 3.2. According to the Krein–Milman theorem, Cx has an extreme point ( f1, . . . , fn). We shall show that each of
fi is a characteristic function. Suppose to the contrary, that fi is not a characteristic function for some i ∈ N . By virtue
of that ( f1, . . . , fn) ∈ A, we may assume without loss of generality that there exist  > 0 and A ∈ F with (A) > 0
such that  < f1, f2 < 1 −  on A. It follows from the Lyapunov’s convexity theorem that there exists a measurable
subset B ⊂ A such that (B) = 12 (A). Set h = (
A − 2
B). Then h0, 0 ≤ f1 ± h, f2 ± h ≤ 1, and (h) = 0. Since
ˆi ( fi ± h) = i (( fi ± h)) = ˆi ( fi ) ≥ xi for i = 1, 2, we have ( f1 ± h, f2 ∓ h, f3, . . . , fn) ∈ Cx . This yields:
( f1, . . . , fn) = 12 [( f1 + h, f2 − h, f3, . . . , fn) + ( f1 − h, f2 + h, f3, . . . , fn)] ∈ Cx ,
which means that ( f1, . . . , fn) is a convex combination of the distinct elements ( f1 + h, f2 − h, f3, . . . , fn) and
( f1 − h, f2 + h, f3, . . . , fn) in Cx , a contradiction to the fact that ( f1, . . . , fn) is an extreme point in Cx . 
The next theorem is now an immediate consequence of Proposition 4.2 and Corollary 4.1.
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Theorem 4.2. If for an exchange economy E = 〈(,F),i , i 〉i∈N , utility function i is of the form i = i ◦  such
that i : R() → R is continuous and quasiconcave for each i ∈ N , then there exists a fuzzy core partition.
Corollary 4.2. If for an exchange economy E = 〈(,F),i , i 〉i∈N , utility function i is -concave and -continuous
at every A ∈ F with (A) ∈ bdR() for each i ∈ N , then there exists a fuzzy core partition.
Proof. By Corollary 2.1, i is of the form i = i ◦  such that i : R() → R is continuous and concave for each
i ∈ N . The corollary follows from Theorem 4.2. 
Since a fuzzy core partition is a core partition, Theorem 4.2 is an extension of Hüsseinov [15] and Sagara and Vlach
[24], the former proved the existence of core partitions for the case, where utility functions of the individuals are
continuous quasiconcave transformations of a finite-dimensional nonatomic vector measure and the latter for the case
of concave measures.
5. Optimality and supporting prices
In this section we characterize (weak) Pareto optimal allocations for an extended exchange economy Ê = 〈X , 
i ,
ˆi 〉i∈N in terms of supporting prices. Under the continuity, quasiconcavity and strict monotonicity assumptions on utility
functions, the supportability of allocations by prices is shown to be equivalent to Pareto optimality. This observation
leads to the second fundamental theorem of welfare economics for the present model: every Pareto optimal allocation
is a competitive equilibrium with transfers of economy E = 〈(,F),i , i 〉i∈N . For the existence of competitive
equilibria for E = 〈(,F),i , i 〉i∈N in a more general setting, see Hüsseinov [17].
5.1. Existence of supporting prices
Let ba(,F, ) be the vector subspace of ba(,F) whose elements vanish at every A ∈ F with (A) = 0. Then,
ba(,F, ) is the dual space of L∞(,F, ) (see [8, Theorem IV.8.16]).
Definition 5.1. A nonzero element  ∈ ba(,F, ) is a supporting price for an allocation ( f1, . . . , fn) for Ê =
〈X , 
i , ˆi 〉i∈N if ˆi ( fi ) ≤ ˆi ( f ) for f ∈ X implies ( fi ) ≤ ( f ).
Definition 5.2. An allocation ( f1, . . . , fn) for Ê = 〈X , 
i , ˆi 〉i∈N is
(i) weakly Pareto optimal if there exists no allocation (g1, . . . , gn) such that ˆi ( fi ) < ˆi (gi ) for each i ∈ N .
(ii) Pareto optimal if there exists no allocation (g1, . . . , gn) such that ˆi ( fi ) ≤ ˆi (gi ) for each i ∈ N and ˆ j ( f j ) < ˆ j (g j )
for some j ∈ N .
It is easy to see that every (fuzzy) core allocation for Ê = 〈X , 
i , ˆi 〉i∈N is weakly Pareto optimal. As shown below,
Pareto optimality and weak Pareto optimality coincide whenever each i satisfies continuity.
A function  : R() → R is strictly monotonic if x = (x1, . . . , xm), y = (y1, . . . , ym) ∈ R() and xk < yk for each
k = 1, . . . ,m imply (x) < (y).
Proposition 5.1. If for an exchange economy E = 〈(,F),i , i 〉i∈N , utility function i is of the form i = i ◦  such
that i : R() → R is continuous and strictly monotonic for each i ∈ N , then an allocation for Ê = 〈X , 
i , ˆi 〉i∈N
is Pareto optimal if and only if it is weakly Pareto optimal.
Proof. It is evident that Pareto optimality implies weak Pareto optimality. We show the converse implication. Let
( f1, . . . , fn) be an allocation for Ê that is not Pareto optimal. Then, there is an allocation (g1, . . . , gn) such that
ˆi ( fi ) ≤ ˆi (gi ) for each i ∈ N and ˆ j ( f j ) < ˆ j (g j ) for some j ∈ N . As  j is strictly monotonic, there exists A ∈ F
with (A) > 0 on which g j is positive. The mutual absolute continuity of 1, . . . , m yields k(A) > 0 for each k =
1, . . . ,m. By the weak* continuity of ˆ j established in Lemma 3.1, there is  ∈ (0, 1) such that ˆ j ( f j ) < ˆ j ((1 − )g j ).
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Define hi ∈ L∞(,F, ) by
hi =
⎧⎨⎩ gi +

n − 1 g j if i j,
(1 − )g j otherwise.
It is easy to see that 0 ≤ hi ≤ 1 for each i ∈ N , hi ≥ gi and k(hi ) = k(gi ) + k(g j )/(n − 1) > k(gi ) for i j and
k = 1, . . . ,m. By the strict monotonicity of i , the resulting allocation (h1, . . . , hn) satisfies ˆi ( fi ) < ˆi (hi ) for each
i ∈ N . Thus, allocation ( f1, . . . , fn) is not weakly Pareto optimal. 
A nonzero element  ∈ ba(,F) is positive if (A) ≥ 0 for every A ∈ F .
Theorem 5.1. If for an exchange economy E = 〈(,F),i , i 〉i∈N , utility function i is of the form i = i ◦ 
such that i : R() → R is continuous, quasiconcave and strictly monotonic for each i ∈ N , then an allocation for
Ê = 〈X , 
i , ˆi 〉i∈N is Pareto optimal if and only if it has a positive supporting price.
To prove the theorem, we need the following lemma, whose proof is postponed to Appendix.
Lemma 5.1. If : R() → R is continuous, quasiconcave and strictly monotonic, then has an extension ˆ : Rm+ →
R preserving its properties.
Let Ê = 〈X , 
i , ˆi 〉i∈N be an extended economy where ˆi = i ◦  is continuous, quasiconcave and strictly
monotone for each i ∈ N . Then, each utility function ˆi can be extended further fromX to the positive cone L∞+ (,F, )
of L∞(,F, ). To this end, let ˆi : Rm+ → R be a continuous, quasiconcave, strictly monotonic extension of i :
R() → R provided by Lemma 5.1. Then, we obtain an extension ˆˆi : L∞+ (,F, ) → R of i by ˆˆi = ˆi ◦ . We
denote by Ê = 〈L∞+ (,F, ), 
i , ˆˆi 〉i∈N the extension of the economy Ê . Allocations for Ê are precisely those for Ê
and supporting prices for Ê are those for Ê . This observation is employed in the sequel.
Proof of Theorem 5.1. Assume that an allocation ( f1, . . . , fn) for an extended economy Ê = 〈X , 
i , ˆi 〉i∈N has
a positive supporting price  ∈ ba(,F, ). Also, suppose by way of contradiction that ( f1, . . . , fn) is not Pareto
optimal. Then by Proposition 5.1, there exists another allocation (g1, . . . , gn) for Ê such that ˆi ( fi ) < ˆi (gi ) for
each i ∈ N . By the supportability of , we have ( fi ) ≤ (gi ) for each i ∈ N . Since 0 < () =
∑
i∈N ( fi ) =∑
i∈N (gi ), we must have ( fi ) = (gi ) for each i ∈ N . By the weak* continuity of ˆi established in
Lemma 3.1, there is  ∈ (0, 1) such that ˆi ( fi ) < ˆi (gi ) for each i ∈ N . Again, by the supportability of , we
obtain ( fi ) ≤ (gi ) = ( fi ), which yields ( fi ) = 0 for each i ∈ N , and hence, 0 =
∑
i∈N ( fi ) = (),
a contradiction.
Conversely, let ( f1, . . . , fn) be a Pareto optimal allocation for Ê . Then, it is likewise a Pareto optimal alloca-
tion for the extended economy Ê . Let int L∞+ (,F, ) be the norm interior of L∞+ (,F, ). Define Gi = {g ∈
L∞+ (,F, )|ˆˆi ( fi ) ≤ ˆˆi (g)} for each i ∈ N and G =
∑
i∈N Gi − 1. Since ˆi is quasiconcave, Gi is convex, and
hence, G is also convex. We shall show that G ∩ (−int L∞+ (,F, )) = ∅. Suppose, to the contrary, that the intersection
G ∩ (−int L∞+ (,F, )) is nonempty. Then, there exists gi ∈ Gi and v ∈ int L∞+ (,F, ) such that
∑
i∈N gi + v = 1.
Setting hi = gi + (1/n)v for each i ∈ N yields an allocation (h1, . . . , hn) such that ˆˆi ( fi ) < ˆˆi (hi ) for each i ∈ N in
view of v > 0 and the strict monotonicity of ˆi proven in Lemma 5.1. This contradicts the (weak) Pareto optimality
of ( f1, . . . , fn).
It follows from the separation theorem (see [8, Theorem V.1.12]) that there exist a nonzero element  ∈ ba(,F, )
and a constant a ∈ R such that −( f ) ≤ a ≤ (g) for every f ∈ int L∞+ (,F, ) and g ∈ G. Since 0 ∈ G, we have
a ≤ 0. If a < 0, then ( f ) ≥ −a > 0 for every f ∈ int L∞+ (,F, ). However, since (0) = 0 and  is continuous at
the origin in the norm topology of L∞(,F, ), there exists  > 0 such that |( f )| < −a for every f ∈ L∞(,F, )
with ‖ f ‖∞ < , a contradiction. Hence, a = 0. We claim that  is positive. Suppose to the contrary, that (A) < 0 for
some A ∈ F . Let f ∈ int L∞+ (,F, ) be arbitrary and take  > 0 sufficiently small so that (A) + ( f ) < 0. Then,
we have (
A +  f ) = (A) + ( f ) < 0, a contradiction, because 
A +  f ∈ int L∞+ (,F, ).
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If ˆˆi ( fi ) ≤ ˆˆi (g), then g − fi ∈ G because g − fi ∈ Gi − (1 −
∑
j∈N\{i} f j ) ⊂
∑
i∈N Gi − 1 = G. By the
separation property in the above, ( fi ) ≤ (g) must hold. Therefore,  is a nonnegative supporting price for ( f1, . . . , fn)
for Ê . 
5.2. Supporting prices in L1
As observed by Bewley [5, p. 516], “one could call any element of ba a price system, but since those elements of
ba not belonging to L1 have no economic interpretation, we will be interested only in equilibria with price systems in
L1.” “[T]heorem [5.1] ... would be of little interest if one could not find interesting conditions under which equilibrium
price systems could be chosen from L1.” (See [5, p. 523].)
Theorem 5.2. If for an exchange economy E = 〈(,F),i , i 〉i∈N , utility function i is of the form i = i ◦ 
such that i : R() → R is continuous, quasiconcave and strictly monotonic for each i ∈ N , then every Pareto
optimal allocation (in particular, every fuzzy core partition) for Ê = 〈X , 
i , ˆi 〉i∈N has a positive supporting price
in L1(,F, ).
To prove the theorem, the Yosida–Hewitt decomposition of finitely additive measures (see [26, Theorems 1.22 and
1.24, 8, Theorem III.7.6.8, 8, Theorem III.7.6.8]) plays a crucial role.
A positive element  ∈ ba(,F) is purely finitely additive if every countably additive measure  satisfying 0 ≤  ≤ 
is identically zero.
Theorem 5.3 (Yosida and Hewitt).
(i) A positive element  ∈ ba(,F) is decomposed uniquely into  = c + p, where c ≥ 0 is countably additive
and p ≥ 0 is purely finitely additive.
(ii) If  ∈ ba(,F) is purely finitely additive and  ≥ 0, and  ≥ 0 is countably additive, then there exists a sequence
{Aq} in F such that:
(a) Aq ⊂ Aq+1 for each q = 1, 2, . . .;
(b) limq ( \ Aq ) = 0;
(c) (Aq ) = 0 for each q = 1, 2, . . ..
Proof of Theorem 5.2. Let  ∈ ba(,F, ) be a positive supporting price for a weakly Pareto optimal allocation
( f1, . . . , fn) for Ê , whose existence is assured in Theorem 5.1. It follows from Theorem 5.3(i) that  is decomposed
uniquely into the countable additive part c ≥ 0 and the purely finitely additive part p ≥ 0 such that  = c + p.
Moreover, by Theorem 5.3(ii), there exists a sequence {Aq} in F such that (a) Aq ⊂ Aq+1 for each q = 1, 2, . . .; (b)
limq ( \ Aq ) = 0; (c) p( f 
Aq ) = 0 for every f ∈ L∞(F,, ) and q = 1, 2, . . ..
First we show that c is nonzero. Suppose to the contrary that c = 0. Since ∑i∈N ( fi ) = () > 0, there exists
j ∈ N such that ( f j ) > 0. Take any function g ∈ L1(,F, ). Then, we have∣∣∣∣∫ f j
Aq g d− ∫ f j g d∣∣∣∣ ≤ ‖ f j‖∞ ∫ |1 − 
Aq ||g|d = ‖ f j‖∞ ∫
\Aq
|g|d → 0
as q → ∞. Hence, f j
Aq is weakly* convergent to f j in L∞(,F, ). 2 Let  > 0 be arbitrary. Since f j
Aq + 
 →
f + 
 in the weak* topology of L∞(,F, ) as q → ∞, by the weak* continuity of ˆˆ j and the strict monotonicity
of ˆ j , we have ˆˆ j ( f j ) < ˆˆ j ( f j
Aq + 
) for all sufficiently large q . By the supportability of  for Ê , we have
0 < ( f j ) ≤ ( f j
Aq + 
) = c( f j
Aq ) + p( f j
Aq ) + () = ().
Since  > 0 was arbitrary, we obtain 0 < ( f j ) ≤ 0, a contradiction.
Suppose that ˆi ( fi ) ≤ ˆi ( f ). Take any  > 0. Since f 
Aq + 
 → f + 
 in the weak* topology of L∞(,F, )
as q → ∞, by the weak* continuity of ˆˆi and the strict monotonicity of ˆi , we have ˆˆi ( fi ) < ˆˆi ( f 
Aq + 
) for all
2 More specifically, one can show that this convergence is in the Mackey topology on L∞(,F , ). See Bewley [5, Appendix I (24)].
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sufficiently large q . Since  is a supporting price for allocation ( f1, . . . , fn) for Ê , we have ( fi ) ≤ ( f 
Aq + 
),
and hence
c( fi ) ≤ ( fi ) ≤ c( f 
Aq + 
) + p( f 
Aq + 
) = c( f 
Aq ) + () ≤ c( f ) + (),
where the last inequality employs the fact that 0 ≤ f 
Aq ≤ f and c ≥ 0. Since  > 0 was arbitrary, we obtain
c( fi ) ≤ c( f ). Therefore, c is a positive supporting price in L1(,F, ). 
The above proof demonstrates that a supporting price  is decomposed uniquely into a countably additive part c and
a purely finitely additive part p, and p is negligible in the valuation of the Pareto optimal allocation. The supporting
price c has the Radon–Nikodym derivative with respect to . Therefore, c is represented by a state-dependent price
p :  → R in L1(,F, ), where the value of a piece A ∈ F is calculated via the integral c(A) = ∫A p d.
“Such prices have very natural economic interpretations. For instance, if we interpret elements of  as representing
states of the world, so that a function in L∞(,F, ) represents a bundle of contingent commodities, then a function
in L1(,F, ) represents commodity/state prices. However, prices in ba(,F, ) that do not belong to L1(,F, )
seem to have no natural economic interpretation.” (See [20, p. 1861].)
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Appendix A. Continuous, quasiconcave, strictly monotonic extensions
For vectors x = (x1, . . . , xn), y = (y1, . . . , yn) ∈ Rm , denote x ≤ y to mean that xk ≤ yk for each k = 1, . . . ,m
and x>y to mean that xk < yk for each k = 1, . . . ,m. The positive and strictly positive orthants of Rm are given,
respectively by Rm+ = {x ∈ Rm |x ≥ 0} and Rm++ = {x ∈ Rm |x?0}.
Let C ⊂ Rm . A function : C → R is monotonic if x ≤ y and x, y ∈ C imply(x) ≤ (y); is strictly monotonic
if x>y and x, y ∈ C imply (x) < (y).
Proposition A.1. Let c = (c1, . . . , cm) ∈ Rm++ and C be a compact convex subset of
∏m
k=1[0, ck] that contains 0 and
c satisfying x>c for every x ∈ C with xc. If  : C → R is continuous, quasiconcave and strictly monotonic, then 
has an extension ˆ : Rm+ → R preserving its properties.
Proof. First, we extend  to D = Rm+ \ (c + Rm++). For a point x ∈ D, set 0(x) = max{(y)|y ∈ C, y ≤ x}. Then,
0 is a continuous extension of  to D. To verify this claim, define the set-valued mapping  : DC by (x) =
{y ∈ C |y ≤ x}. Then,  is nonempty-, compact-, convex-valued and continuous. Since 0(x) = maxy∈(x) (y) for
every x ∈ D, the continuity of  and  implies that the marginal function 0 is continuous on D by Berge’s maximum
theorem (see [4, p. 116]).
Let x, x ′ ∈ D with x>x ′ be arbitrary and 0(x) = (x¯) for some x¯ ∈ C \ {c}. Since x>x ′, there exists y ∈ C
such that x¯>y ≤ x ′. By the strict monotonicity of , we have (x¯) < (y). Therefore, 0(x) < 0(x ′), that is,
0 is strictly monotonic. Let x, x ′ ∈ D and t ∈ [0, 1] be such that t x + (1 − t)x ′ ∈ D and let 0(x) = (x¯) and
0(x ′) = (x¯ ′) for some x¯, x¯ ′ ∈ C . By the quasiconcavity of, we have min{(x¯),(x¯ ′)} ≤ (t x¯ +(1−t)x¯ ′). Because
t x¯ + (1 − t)x¯ ′ ≤ t x + (1 − t)x ′, we have, by the definition of 0, that (t x¯ + (1 − t)x¯ ′) ≤ 0(t x + (1 − t)x ′). The last
two inequalities imply that min{0(x),0(x ′)} = min{(x¯),(x¯ ′)} ≤ 0(t x + (1 − t)x ′). Thus, 0 is quasiconcave
on D. 3
3 Here, D is not a convex set, but the definition of quasiconcavity can be generalized on nonconvex sets as follows:  : D → R is quasiconcave if
for every x, x ′ ∈ D and t ∈ [0, 1] such that t x + (1 − t)x ′ ∈ D, we have min{(x),(x ′)} ≤ (t x + (1 − t)x ′).
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We now extend function 0 to Rm+ by setting:
ˆ(x) :=
⎧⎨⎩
0(x) if x ∈ D,
m∏
k=1
(xk − ck) + 0(c) otherwise.
It is easy to verify that ˆ preserves the continuity and strict monotonicity properties of . To demonstrate the quasi-
concavity of ˆ, let, for instance, x ∈ D and x ′ ∈ c +Rm++, and assume that y = t x + (1 − t)x ′ ∈ D for t ∈ [0, 1]. We
then have ˆ(x) ≤ ˆ(x ∨ y) = ˆ(y) ≤ ˆ(c) ≤ ˆ(x ′), where x ∨ y is the coordinatewise maximum of x and y in Rm .
Hence, min{ˆ(x), ˆ(x ′)} = ˆ(x) ≤ ˆ(y). The other cases can be checked easily. 
Since we have assumed that the component measures of  = (1, . . . , m) are mutually absolutely continuous, for
every x ∈ R() with x(), we have x>(). Taking into account this observation, Lemma 5.1 can be deduced
from Proposition A.1.
If  : C → R is continuous, concave and monotonic, then an extension ˜ : Rm+ → R of , preserving its properties,
is given by
˜(x) = max{(y) | y ∈ C, y ≤ x}.
This extension was suggested by Einy et al. [11]. Unfortunately, when  is continuous, quasiconcave and strictly
monotonic, the extension ˜ to Rm+ does not necessarily preserve its properties (strict monotonicity might be violated).
We have exploited this extension not on the entire domain Rm+, but on D in the proof of Proposition A.1. For a general
treatment of extensions of continuous, (strictly) monotonic functions, see Hüsseinov [16].
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